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The Dynamic Effects of Agricultural
Subsidies in the United States
Harry de Gorter and Eric O'N. Fisher
This article analyzes the dynamic effects of the farm subsidies in the United
States. The subsidies a farmer receives are based upon historical plantings, also
called base acreage. It is sometimes optimal for a farmer temporarily not to
participate in a program in order to increase future subsidies. The farmer's
optimal policy is the solution to a deterministic dynamic program. Farmers
with low base acreage opt out of these programs, whereas those with high base
acreage participate in them. The article examines aggregate data involving corn,
cotton, rice, and wheat during 1987. It shows that these programs increase the
output of each of these crops and represent an annual deadweight loss of more
than $2 billion.
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Introduction
He was a long-limbed farmer, a God fearing, freedom-loving, law-abiding rugged individualist
who held that federal aid to anyone but farmers was creeping socialism.... His specialty was alfalfa,
and he made a good thing of not growing any. The government paid him well for every bushel of
alfalfa he did not grow. The more alfalfa he did not grow, the more money the government gave
him, and he spent every penny he didn't earn on new land to increase the amount of alfalfa he did
not produce.... He invested in land wisely and soon was not growing more alfalfa than any other
man in the country....
[H]e was an outspoken champion of economy in government, provided it did not interfere with
the sacred duty of government to pay farmers as much as they could get for all the alfalfa they
produced that no one else wanted or for not producing any alfalfa at all.
(Joseph Heller, Catch 22, pp. 82-83)'
The analysis of acreage restriction programs is one of the staples of an introductory course
in economics. For example, Samuelson and Nordhaus (p. 433) explain:
... [I]n the 1980s the Treasury simply mailed a subsidy payment to farmers for every bushel of
wheat or corn harvested.
One of the most common government farm programs requires farmers to restrict planted acre-
age.... If the Department of Agriculture requires every farmer to "set aside" 20 percent of the last
year's planted area of corn, this has the effect of shifting the supply curve of corn to the left. Because
the demands for corn and most other agricultural products are inelastic, such crop restrictions not
only raise the price of corn and other products; they also tend to raise the total revenues earned by
farmers and total farm incomes.
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This is a typical representation of farm policy in the United States; it emphasizes the
effect of acreage restrictions in decreasing the supply of crops. However, these acreage
restriction programs are voluntary, and the participation decision is left up to the farmer.
Although some acreage is diverted and some farmers do restrict plantings, there is an
incentive to expand current acreage in anticipation of future subsidies. Samuelson and
Nordhaus recognize the dynamic aspect of these programs by explaining that this year's
subsidies are based in part upon last year's planting. Since a forward-looking farmer may
plant a large acreage in anticipation of next year's subsidies, the net effect of these programs
is not obvious.
The purpose of this article is to pursue this insight more deeply. Our work makes a
theoretical and an empirical contribution to the literature on agricultural policy in the
United States. The theoretical contribution is to model the farmer's planting decisions as
a deterministic dynamic program. Even though the farmer's reward is not continuous in
the level of plantings, we show that the dynamic program has a value function and
characterize the optimal policy it implies. The empirical contribution is to use data from
1987 to show that these subsidies increased the outputs of corn, cotton, rice, and wheat
beyond a benchmark of static perfect competition. The intuition behind this empirical
finding is that small farmers expand their plantings in anticipation of higher future sub-
sidies.
The central feature of these farm policies is that participants in a program are limited
by their base acreages, a fixed proportion of which must be left fallow in order to qualify
for subsidies. The United States currently determines historical base acreage according
to a five-year moving average of "considered plantings."2 Farmers often find it in their
long-run interest to opt out temporarily from the program and increase current planting,
raising base acreage and future subsidies.3 Hence, any dynamic analysis of these programs
must address the extent to which farmers are willing to forego current subsidy payments,
incur extra production costs, and increase current planting in order to increase future
subsidy payments.
The official name for these programs is "base acreage limitations" and participants in
them are subject to the constraint of "acreage diversion." The U.S. Treasury sends two
different checks to participants in the program. One check covers the difference between
the actual price of output and a predetermined target price, and the other covers the land
that the farmer is required to divert. The first is "deficiency payments," and the second
is "diversion payments." The deficiency payment is a per unit subsidy calculated as the
difference between a target price and the maximum of the market price and a "loan rate."4
It is based on an "official" level of production, 5 and the total number of acres planted..
The diversion payment is for crops not planted. Further, for each subsidized crop, there
is a maximum on the total subsidy payments that a farmer may receive in any year.
To the best of our knowledge, the only dynamic analysis of these subsidies is that of
Fisher and de Gorter; that paper explores how these programs affect agricultural exports.
These subsidies are typically analyzed using comparative statics. Both Wallace and Gard-
ner (1984) model acreage diversion as a shift left of the supply curve, as does Gardner
(1987) in his influential text. Lichtenberg and Zilberman give a static analysis of the
welfare effects of environmental regulations on farmers who participate in these acreage
restriction programs. Eckstein applies dynamic programming to the planting decisions of
Egyptian cotton producers.
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. The second section describes the
model and shows that the value function exists. The third section characterizes the implicit
optimal policy. The next section presents simulated solutions to the dynamic program
for the four major field crops in 1987, the only year for which complete data on the
distribution of farm base acreages are available. The final section presents our conclusions.
The data and their sources are detailed in appendix A, and the proofs of the four prop-
ositions describing the farmer's optimal policy are presented in appendix B.
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The Model
Because we are interested in the decisions of an individual farmer, we study a model
of price-taking behavior and assume that the farmer has perfect foresight. Then the farmer's
decision is a deterministic dynamic program. The assumption of perfect foresight is in
part justified by the fact that the target price, the loan rate, the program yield, the diversion
factor, the diversion payments, and the maximal subsidy payment available to a farmer
are all known before the time of planting. Moreover, almost all of these parameters have
not changed dramatically during the last decade. As we shall see below, market price and
a farmer's actual yield do influence the per period reward, but we assume that farmers
take covered positions by using forward contracts in order to ensure against adverse price
movements. Further, we assume that all farmers of a given crop are identical and that
each farmer's output is deterministic.6 In essence, the farmer knows the long-run values
of all parameters before making any planting decisions.
The net revenues of a farm facing price p and having cost c(u) are:
(1) f(p, ut) = pUt - (Ut),
where f: R+ x 1+ --,9 describes a farmer producing ut units of output.
We make the following assumptions about the cost function c(ut):
Assumption 1: The function c(ut) is positive, nondecreasing, and continuous on 9+.
Further, c(O) > 0.
The existence of a solution to the dynamic program is robust with respect to many
specifications of costs, and in practice, we simulate the solution to the dynamic program
using an arbitrary c(ut).
The number of bushels planted (and harvested under the assumption of perfect foresight)
is the farmer's control variable. The analysis below assumes that there is a strict linear
relationship between acres planted and the farmer's eventual harvest. This assumption
entails that yields are fixed and exogenous for the representative farmer, and it limits the
generality of the model. Still, the cost function does capture the idea that the farmer plants
the most fertile land first since it allows for increasing marginal costs. The linear rela-
tionship between acres planted and output produced allows one to describe a simple
transition rule for the farmer's considered plantings. Also, it makes the empirical appli-
cations of the model tractable.
The state variable is the farmer's five-year history of considered plantings denoted by
the vector Xt = (x,_t, . . , xt-)', where xt i is the output equivalent of the farmer's base
acreage in year t - i. The output equivalent of current base acreage is b, = .2xt5 + ...
+ .2xt_,. Again, there is a linear relationship between land as an input and the crop as
an output, justified in part by the fact that we are describing the long-run behavior of the
farmer.
Farmers benefit from two explicit subsidies: deficiency payments and diversion pay-
ments. First, if a farmer participates in a subsidy program and plants sufficient land to
yield ut bushels, the deficiency payments are:
s(p , , L, ; ut)= ['r - max{p, L}]ut,
where r is the target price, p is the market price, 4 is the ratio of program yield to actual
yield, and L is the loan rate. We shall assume, of course, that r > max{p, L}. Second,
farmers receive a payment y per unit of foregone output for the land they leave fallow.
If the farmer's history is xt, then diversion payments are:
S2 (', y; Xt, Ut) = yy max{0, (bt - u)},
which are positive only if the farmer diverts acreage. This payment also depends upon
the program yield.
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Let the vector of parameters be 0 = (p, r, L, A, y)'. Then the total subsidies accruing to
a participant in the program are:
s(xt, ut; 0) min{sl(-) + s2(), 50,000},
which shows that a farmer receives a maximal total subsidy of $50,000. 7 Finally, the
farmer's revenues from the sale of crops on the market are [max{p, L}]ut, since output is
sold at the maximum of market price and the loan rate, and these revenues are based
upon actual yield.
We shall henceforth take 0 as fixed and suppress it as an argument in the functions
below. A subsidized farmer having history xt and planting acreage yielding u, units receives:
(2) h(xt, ut) [max{p, L}]ut + s(xt, u; ) - c(u).
Note that h(xt, ut) is continuous.
Let 6 E [0, 1) be the proportion of acreage that a farmer must leave fallow in order to
qualify for subsidies. Since xt is the state variable summarizing the farmer's five-year
planting history, the reward is:
r(X, u) {h(xt, ut) if u ( - )b
r(" 't) f(p, u.) otherwise,
where again b, is the simple average of the elements of xt. Consider r(xt, u) as a function
of ut; it may have a point of discontinuity occurring at (1 - 6)bt. Still, it can be shown
that r(xt, ut) is upper semi-continuous8 since r > max{p, L}.
The transition rule is
f(xt_4, Xt_3, Xt_2, x 6t_, bb + ut)' ifu, < (1 - 6)bt
(3) Xt+l = (X4 X-3, Xt--42, xt-_, bt)' if (l - 6)bt, t-, bt
[(xt-4, xt-3, xt-2, xt_, u)' if bt < u,
where xt+1 is the farmer's history at time t + 1 and bt is as above. 9
The discount factor satisfies 0 < /5 < 1. Let X be the state and U the control space.
Then the farmer's dynamic program is a four-tupel (X, U, z, 0), where z: X x U- >- X is
the transition rule. A policy is a function ir: X-> U, and the expected discounted return
from 7r is
I()(x) = S-'lr(xs, r(xs)),
S=t
where I(7r)(xt) is the value of following ir when the state is xt E X. An optimal policy is a
plan lr* such that I(r*)(xt) - I(a)(x,) for all 7r and xt E X. We are interested in describing
this function.
If there is an optimal policy, then the value function is
(4) V(x) = maxU,Eu[r(x, u,) + 3V(xt+l)],
where u, is chosen according to wr* and xt+1 is given by (3). Equation (4) has the interpre-
tation that a farmer with base acreage history xt who follows an optimal plan will have
V(xt) as the present discounted value of the subsidy program.
We impose:
Assumption 2: The state space X and the control space U are compact.
This postulate is innocuous enough: yields are not infinite, a farmer has a finite base
acreage, and only a finite plot of land is planted. We now state:
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Theorem: There is a solution to the farmer's dynamic program.
Proof: Since r > max{p, L}, it is easy to check that r(xt, u) is upper semi-continuous
in u,. The transition function given in equation (3) is continuous in u, and it is degenerate;
hence, it is trivially continuous in the sense of the weak convergence of measures. Since
X and U are compact, Maitra's theorem applies. 1
Characterizing the Farmer's Optimal Policy
It will be useful to characterize the farmer's optimal planting program. Define K {(x,,
ut) E X x U: ut < (1 - 6)bt}, where again bt is the average of the elements of xt. The set
Kgives the base acreage histories and current plantings for which a farmer is a participant
in the subsidy program. Since K is a closed subset of a compact set, it is compact itself.
Since both (1) and (2) are upper semi-continuous and U and K are compact, neither
argmaxutuf(p, u) nor argmax(x,,)EKh(xt, ut) is empty. Let up be the smallest ut in
argmaxuuf(p, ut), and let u
,
be the smallest ut in argmax(,,,t)Eh(xt, ut). The maximal values
of these functions are denoted by f*(p) and h*(O), respectively. It is convenient to let b,
be the minimal five-year average of the xt in argmaxxXh(xt, ue). This quantity is the lower
bound on the base acreage needed to obtain h*(O) when planting u,. Finally, let b, be the
vector, each of whose five elements is b0. The quantities up and u, are the smallest static
profit-maximal outputs for a farmer with sufficiently large acreage history facing price p
and policy parameters 0.
We can now state:
Proposition 1: (i) If h*(O) < f*(p), then r*(xt) = up; and
(ii) If h*(O) > f*(p), then 7r*(xt) = u, for all xt > b,.
Proof: See appendix B.
Part (i) of Proposition 1 has the simple interpretation that all farmers will choose to
opt out of the subsidy program and produce the quantity at which the marginal cost of
production equals price if the maximal subsidy payments are sufficiently low. If the
maximal subsidy payments are large enough, part (ii) of Proposition 1 states that farmers
with sufficiently large historical base acreage in each of the five prior years will plant the
one-period profit-maximal acreage.
The following is also true.
Proposition 2: The value function V(xt) is not decreasing.
Proof: See appendix B.
The intuition behind Proposition 2 is straightforward. It states that it never hurts to
have a larger history of base acreage in the last five years. Indeed, if a farmer's base acreage
xt has been sufficiently large, then it is not costly to plant ut < (1 - )bt, where bt is the
average of xt.
In the remainder of the article, we assume that h*(O) > f*(p); this states simply that
there is some base acreage history for which it is profitable to participate in the subsidy
program. Then Proposition 2 describes the optimal policy function and the value function
more precisely.
Proposition 3: If xt >> b, then lr*(xt) = Ue and V(xt) = (1 - f)- 1h*(O). Further, there
is x" << b, such that, for all xt satisfying x" c xt < be, -r*(xt) = (1 - )bt and V(x) =
(1 - )-lh(xt, (1 - )bt).
Proof: See appendix B.
The intuition behind Proposition 3 is simple. It is never optimal for a farmer with
sufficiently large base acreage history to opt out of the subsidy program because the present
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value of the gains from increased base acreage do not offset the current loss in profits
owing to opting out of the program. Hence, the value of the subsidy program for sufficiently
large farms is the present discounted value of maintaining the current base acreage.
The optimal plan also satisfies:
Proposition 4: Assume that f*(p) > 0. Then there is an x' > 0 such that, for all xt
satisfying 0 < Xt < x', ,r*(xt) > (1 - S)bt.
Proof: See appendix B.
Assume that it is at all profitable to produce the crop under conditions of perfect
competition. Then Proposition 4 states that there will be some states for which the farmer
will opt out of the program. This follows from the fact that the program gives small farms
no subsidies in the limit.
Consider a farmer whose historical base acreage is such that it is optimal to opt out of
the subsidy program. If the cost and value functions are differentiable, then this farmer
will plant an acreage equivalent to output ut that is greater than the output at which the
marginal cost of production is equal to market price p. This follows from the fact that
the first order condition for the maximization of (4) is given by
p - c'(u) + .2(3 aV(xt+l)/8xt = 0,
where we have assumed that ut > bt and have used the transition rule (3). Since V(xt+)/
xt, > 0, we may conclude that ut - up, the static profit-maximal output choice when a
farmer faces price p. Hence, the subsidies cause even nonparticipants to produce ineffi-
ciently.
Simulation Results for the Four Major Field Crops
In this section, we use data from 1987 to simulate the dynamic program for the four
major field crops: corn, cotton, rice, and wheat. It is worth repeating here that we are
modeling representative farmers' decisions under certainty in order to make predictions
about national outputs for these crops. Of course, farms produce several products under
conditions of uncertainty, and the empirical implications of our model are not as general
as we might like.
The first step in the simulation involves the farmers' cost function. It is assumed to
have the form:
(5) c(u,) = F + au(?')/',
where ry is the elasticity of supply for the crop in question. The fixed cost F and the
parameter a are derived from national data on fixed and variable costs per unit of output.10
Since there was some difficulty in determining individual farm supply elasticities from
the literature in agricultural economics, three values of the parameter X were considered:
.25, .5, and 1. They correspond, respectively, to the low, medium, and high cases of
individual farm responsiveness.
Table 1 summarizes the aggregate data used to simulate (5). These data allowed one to
compute average output per farm, and then one can recover the fixed cost for each farm.
Each value of n then determines a, using the data on average variable cost.
The policy parameters and market prices are presented in table 2. Data on the distri-
bution of farms are not published. We obtained data for the year 1987 from the U.S.
Department of Agriculture (USDA), Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service,
Commodity Analysis Division, National Agricultural Statistical Services, and they are
dated 30 December 1988. Since we did not have histories of base acreages, we were forced
to assume that xt_5 =. .-. = xt_ = x1987 for each farm. This is a limitation of our analysis,
and a fully dynamic specification of the evolution of farm sizes is a fertile area for future
research.
The state space was divided into 40 discrete points, using increments of 10 acres. The
first group contained all farms between five and 14 acres, the second those between 15
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Table 1. Data Used in Simulating the Cost Functions (1987 dollars
per unit, except for number of farms and total output)
Variable Total Output
Fixed Costs Costs Number of Farms (billions)
Corn .40 .99 1,081,625 7.0721
Cotton .11 .37 117,894 6.9498
Rice 1.05 4.65 19,493 .1296
Wheat .75 1.41 836,397 2.1070
Notes: The costs are in 1987 dollars per unit. The units are all in bushels,
except for cotton and rice. In these cases, it is pounds and cwt., respectively.
Sources: The number of farms represent all farms with greater than four
base acres in 1987; the data on the national distribution of base acreages
were provided by the USDA, Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation
Service, Commodity Analysis Division, National Agricultural Statistical
Services. The output data are from various USDA publications; see ap-
pendix A for details.
and 24, and so on, with the last group containing all farms with at least 400 base acres.
The within-group average output was the representative state for that group, and the
control space was set equal to the state space. We used a discrete approximation to the
rule (3) and the discount factor 1.05 - 1 in all simulations.
Figure 1 gives an example of an optimal policy for a corn farmer whose cost function
has elasticity .5;11 the policies for other crops and other elasticities are largely similar. The
optimal policy is graphed to show planted acreage. Any farmer planting more than his or
her historical base is not a participant in the program. Otherwise, a farmer diverts at least
the requisite base acreage and may even plant a lower acreage than required.
It is striking that a farmer with small base acreage is not a participant in the crop
restriction program. It has been the popular conception that agricultural subsidies in the
United States have been intended to help the small family farm. But Proposition 2 shows
that these policies benefit big farms more than small ones. This theoretical result is
corroborated by an analysis of aggregate data on the participation rates for the four crops.
The average base acreage in 1987 of participants in the programs for corn, cotton, rice,
and wheat was 83.7, 121.9, 200.7, and 137.6, respectively; the equivalent figures for
nonparticipants in that year were 14.1, 39, 54.2, and 20.12
We use the historical distribution of base acreage in 1987 for all farms in the United
States to determine the supply of each crop in 1987. Figure 2 presents that distribution
for corn; the other crops have the same skewed shape for their distributions. In order to
contrast the results with the output that would prevail in the absence of these programs,
Table 2. The Parameters in 1987
Ratio of
Program
Yield to
Market Target Loan Diversion Diversion Actual
Price Price Rate Factor Payments Yield
Corn $1.94 $ 3.03 $1.82 .314 $.59 .857
Cotton $ .64 $ .79 $ .52 .286 $.00 .873
Rice $6.95 $11.66 $6.84 .392 $.00 .898
Wheat $2.57 $ 4.38 $2.28 .312 $.00 1.106
Notes: Prices are dollars per bushel, pound, or cwt., as relevant. Diversion
payments are in dollars per bushel, pound, or cwt., not planted. The actual
yields per acre for corn, cotton, rice, and wheat were 122.49, 679.32, 54.67,
and 31.64, respectively.
Sources: See appendix A for a full description.
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Figure 1. Optimal policy for corn
we calculated the perfectly competitive aggregate outputs corresponding to the total num-
ber of farmers with more than four base acres in 1987 and to the market prices given in
table 2.13 The model's predictions appear in table 3.
The predictions on the relative effects of the programs on aggregate outputs are apt to
be accurate because any bias in the determination of the cost functions affects the sim-
ulation results of the dynamic program and the predicted perfectly competitive outputs
symmetrically. It is remarkable that these crop restriction programs increased output in
1987. Of course, this result is valid only if our simplifying empirical assumption about
the historical distribution of base acreage is valid for that year. It is quite possible that
the long-run effect of these programs would be to restrict output with respect to the
appropriate invariant distribution of the state space. Indeed, aggregate base acreage has
decreased for some of these crops in the latter part of the last decade.
It is also interesting to analyze the effect that these crop restriction programs have on
producer surplus. The solutions to the dynamic programs are the present values of producer
surplus. Although the value functions are not reported here, it is easy to calculate producer
surplus for each crop by using the distributions of base acreages. Further, producer surplus
under perfect competition is the present value of the static quasi-rents corresponding to
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Figure 2. Distribution of farm size: Corn in 1987
the price in table 2. The calculations concerning producer surplus are reported in the
second half of table 3. The existence of crop restriction programs typically doubles pro-
ducer surplus. Indeed, using the supply parameters that best fit the actual output, we see
that these programs raise the present value of producer surplus for these four crops by
$207.2 billion, representing a transfer of $10.4 billion or .2% of the United States' gross
national product.
The model also has positive implications for the change in the distribution of base
acreage from 1987 to 1988. Although we were unable to obtain data on the complete
distribution of base acreage in 1988, we did receive aggregate data on base acreage in
those two years. Base acreage increased for each of the four crops between 1987 and 1988.
The model predicts that base acreage increases for all of the crops, but the predicted
increases tend to be more conservative than the actual ones. Table 4 reports these results.
We conclude with a calculation of the production deadweight loss that these programs
entail. 14 We are in a second-best world, and these subsidies may be an inevitable part of
the political process. It is still interesting to calculate their deadweight loss as a proportion
of the total economic transfer to farmers. This is the incremental cost, net of the value
of increased output, that the induced excess production for each crop entails. These
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Table 3. Predicted Aggregate Outputs and Producer Surplus
Output Producer Surplus
(billions) (billions)
Perfect Crop Perfect Crop
Competition Restrictions Competition Restrictions
Corn, low 5.6 6.4 123.0 232.1
Corn, medium* 5.7 6.7 95.8 231.9
Corn, high 6.9 10.8 81.7 248.8
Cotton, low 5.3 5.9 41.3 47.2
Cotton, medium 5.3 5.9 31.2 40.7
Cotton, high* 6.0 7.6 24.3 36.0
Rice, low .10 .11 8.3 13.6
Rice, medium* .09 .12 6.0 12.1
Rice, high .10 .16 4.2 11.7
Wheat, low 1.6 1.8 37.5 81.4
Wheat, medium* 1.6 2.2 25.9 79.2
Wheat, high 1.9 3.3 18.6 88.6
Notes: Output for corn and wheat is in bushels, that for cotton is in pounds,
and that for rice is in cwt. Producer surplus is in present value dollars. An
asterisk (*) denotes the simulated supply elasticity that gives rise to the best
fit to the actual data on market supply in table 1.
calculations are presented in table 5. The United States could save $48 billion in present
value of wasted resources simply by giving these farmers a lump-sum transfer of $207.2
billion and then abolishing all of these programs.
Conclusion
This article develops a dynamic analysis of the crop restriction programs of the United
States. The decision to participate in these programs is voluntary, and we solve the dynamic
program that the farmer faces. The optimal policy for small farmers is to build up base
acreage; this is akin to rent-seeking behavior by producers who are not currently partic-
ipating in these programs. Acreage diversion, the target price, the loan rate, the difference
Table 4. Aggregate Base Acreage in 1987 and 1988
1987 1988
Actual Model Basis Actual Model Prediction
-........-........-..--------------- -  (M illions of acres) ---------------------------------------------
Corn 66.8 69.1 68.5 69.5
Cotton 11.2 12.3 12.9 12.7
Rice 2.9 3.4 3.2 3.4
Wheat 71.6 74.3 72.5 77.0
Notes: Model basis represents the aggregate acreage of all farms with base
greater than four acres. The predicted aggregate base acreage for 1988 is
calculated using the optimal policy function that best fits the actual 1987
output and the transition function given in equation (3).
Sources: The source of the data for actual base acreage is described in the
last paragraph of appendix A. The source for model basis in 1987 was a
USDA tape consisting of fully disaggregated data on the distribution of
base for each crop; see the text for a full description. This tape is dated
earlier than the source for the "actual" data, and this may be the reason
for the discrepancy in the two columns concerning 1987.
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Table 5. Social Cost of the Crop Restriction Programs
Annual Deadweight Deadweight Loss as a
Production Loss Percentage of Increased
(billions 1987 dollars) Farmer Surplus
Corn 1.3 21
Cotton .2 37
Rice .1 27
Wheat .8 32
Notes: The first column is the incremental production costs owing to the
crop restriction programs net of the increased value of farm output, both
measured at annual rates. The second column is the present value of the
first column of this table as a percentage of the difference between the fourth
and third columns of table 3 for the cases which best fit the actual output
in 1987.
between actual and program yields, and diversion payments all affect the incentives of
both participants and nonparticipants.
We have not explored the implications of this model on the long-run distribution of
farm sizes, but we showed that small farms tend to increase plantings. This may explain
in part the evolution of the structure of farming in the United States in this half century.
The family farm may be simply too small to take full advantage of the government's price
support programs. The single most important empirical finding is that, in 1987, these
crop restriction programs resulted in higher output than would have occurred in their
absence. The present value of resources wasted in this rent-seeking behavior was $48
billion.
[Received December 1992; final revision received March 1993.]
Notes
'Farm subsidies in the United States have never included alfalfa; still, we hope the reader indulges Mr. Heller
his poetic license. Farmers producing barley, oats, and sorghum have received subsidies; de Gorter and Fisher
describe the effects of these programs on those feed grains.
2 Considered plantings are the sum of actual planting and acres diverted under the requirements of a subsidy
program.
3 See Ericksen and Collins.
4 This is an official predetermined selling price that the federal government guarantees for any farmer in the
program. The government maintains the loan rate by stockpiling farm output. The cost of this policy is borne
by the Commodity Credit Corporation, and it is independent of the deficiency and diversion payment schemes.
5 This "official" level of production is determined from a five-year rolling average in which the years with the
highest and lowest yields per acre are eliminated. This is called "program yield," and it is often, though not
always, lower than actual yield. A farmer's program yield is known at the time of planting.
6 We recognize, frankly, that both land and farmers come in different qualities and that each farmer's output
is stochastic. Since we are not limiting ourselves to quadratic cost functions, the effect of incorporating uncertainty
about yield into the farmer's dynamic optimization would complicate the analysis considerably. Including
individual farm characteristics would create analogous difficulties. Further, in the empirical work in the pen-
ultimate section, we cannot hope to analyze individual yield per farmer with aggregate data.
7 Farmers have been quite ingenious in circumventing this maximum. For example, they have subdivided
farms into several corporations. It has been particularly easy to give such a corporation to one's child, thus
keeping the benefits of federal subsidies in the family. Farmers have also leased their land to employees, charging
rents high enough to capture a substantial part of the implicit government benefits. Sumner provides a good
discussion of this issue.
8 Let f: X -, >1, and consider a sequence {x,}, each of whose elements is in X, such that x, -- xO. Then fix)
is upper semi-continuous at Xo if lim,_ J(x,) < fJ(xo). The function J(x) is upper semi-continuous if it is upper
semi-continuous at each element in its domain.
9 If a farmer diverts exactly the required acreage, then historical base does not diminish; however, if one
wishes to decrease historical base, we assume that the required acreage diversion is part of one's considered
plantings in year t.
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10 Since we are using a smooth cost function, we are assuming that the farmer faces no acreage limitations
over the relevant ranges of planting. This is not unreasonable for small increases in plantings, but it may not
be appropriate for farms that expand their base acreages radically.
1 In figure 1, we have converted the state and control variables into acres for ease of exposition.
12 Because data on the participation decisions of individual farms were not available, we used aggregate data
on the number of participants and nonparticipants to calculate these averages. These data were provided by the
USDA, Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service (via correspondence dated 30 December 1988); they
are not published.
13 We are assuming for simplicity that the price of each of these crops is fixed by conditions in the world
market, and we are also assuming implicitly that the total number of farms is unchanged under conditions of
perfect competition. The aggregate output is thus the total output of a fixed number of identical farmers.
14 Since output prices are fixed by assumption, there is no consumption deadweight loss.
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Appendix A: Data
The data on costs of production are reported in McElroy et al. Fixed costs are based upon the gross value of a
crop relative to that of all crops grown on a farm. The national average is obtained by taking a weighted average
of these fixed costs. These authors use a similar technique in calculating aggregate data on variable costs.
The data on the number of farms in the United States refer to farms that have at least five base acres in 1987.
These farms may or may not be participants in the relevant programs in that year. The source is USDA,
Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service, Commodity Analysis Division, National Agricultural Sta-
tistical Services.
The data for total output of these crops are obtained from U.S. Department of Agriculture/Economic Research
Service (USDA/ERS) publications: Wheat Situation and Outlook Report (August 1989), Feed Situation and
Outlook Report (August 1989), Rice Situation and Outlook Report (April 1989), and Cotton and Wool Situation
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and Outlook Report (May 1989). The yield per acre refers to planted acres, and these data are again from McElroy
et al.
Market prices, target prices, and loan rates are from the USDA/ERS Situation and Outlook Report for the
relevant crop. The diversion requirements are calculated as the ratio of acres diverted to total base acreage.
Acres diverted include those in programs involving "acreage reduction," "paid land diversion," "payment in
kind," "0/92," and "50/92." The acres placed into the long-term conservation reserve program are not included
in acres diverted. For all crops but cotton, the unpublished source for these data is the USDA's Agricultural
Stabilization Conservation Service, Commodity Analysis Division. The data for corn are dated July 1989, those
for wheat are dated 10 May 1989, and those for rice are dated October 1989. The corresponding data about
acreage diverted for cotton are from the USDA, Office of Information, News, dated 10 March 1989, and the
data on cotton base acreage are found in Stults et al. (pp. 77 and 79).
The program yields are in units per acre planted. The diversion payments per unit not planted are calculated
as the ratio of total diversion payments to this product: total acres diverted multiplied by program yields. For
all crops except cotton, the sources for these data are the same as those for acres diverted, as described in the
paragraph above. The data for cotton are found in Stults et al. (p. 79).
The data on actual aggregate base acreage in 1987 and 1988 do not include acreage placed in long-term
conservation reserve programs. They were obtained by private correspondence with the USDA's Agricultural
Stabilization and Conservation Service, Commodity Analysis Division; this correspondence is dated 23 October
1990.
Appendix B: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: If h*(O) < f*(p), then the static profit-maximal choice of output is up, even for farms
with sufficiently large base acreage. Hence, for any state xt, -r*(x,) = up. This proves (i).
If h*(O) > f*(p), the static profit-maximal output for a participant with sufficiently large base acreage is us.
Hence, a farmer with base acreage history x, > bo may plant ue and earn no less than h*(O) per period. Since
X,> bo, bt+, > be, the lower bound for the five-year average of x. This implies that the state next period will
be such that the one-period profit-maximal choice of acreage will again be possible. O
Proof of Proposition 2: Let x, - yt, where this is a vector inequality. Let ut E argmax r(x, u,) and vt E argmax
r(y, u,), where the dependence of u* on x, and that of v* on y, has been suppressed for convenience. Since xt <
Yt, r(x, ut*) < r(yt, vt). Further, since each element of xt is not greater than the corresponding element of yt, we
may always choose u7 and vt such that u7 < vt. This implies that x,+, = z(xt, u*) < z(yt, v*) = Yt+,, again a
vector inequality. Hence, r(x,+,, uT*+) < r(yt+,, v*+,), where ut,, and v*+, are analogous to u* and vt. But this
is true for every subsequent period s > t + 1. Now let -r* be an optimal policy. Then I(7r*)(xt) < I(7r*)(y,), and
thus V(xt) < V(y,). O
Proof of Proposition 3: If xt > be, then Proposition 1 implies that 7r*(x,) = uo. This implies that x,+1 > bo and
7r*(xt+,) = us again. Hence, even though x, and xt+, may be different, they both entail the same optimal level
of planting. But then V(xt) = (1 - f)- h*(O).
Now let x, be such that x" < xt < bo, where x" is sufficiently close to be. Assume that for some xt satisfying
x" < Xt < bo, it is the case that ut = 7r*(xt) > (1 - 6)b,. Then:
V(x,) = f(p, ut) + (3V(x,+,) < f(p, u,) + /(1 - 3)- h*(O) < f*(p) + f(1 - /)-'h*(O)
= f*(p) + #(1 - /)-'h*(be, us),
where the first inequality follows from V(xt+,) < V(xo) = (1 - ')-lh(xe, Uo), the second since up E argmax f(p,
ut), and the equality from h*(O) = h(be, ue). Since lr* is an optimal plan, planting ut = (1 - O)bt may not be
optimal. Then it follows that (1 - /)- h(xt, (1 - 5)bt) < V(xt). But this implies that
(1 - )-'h(x1 , (1 - 6)b,) < f*(p) + /(1 - /)-'h(bo, us)
*h(xt, (1 - )bt) - (1 - P)f*(p) + /3h(be, uo).
This inequality is contradicted because h(xt, (1 - /)b,) is continuous in x,, and p < r implies that, for xt in a
neighborhood of bo, f*(p) < h(x,, (1 - 6)b,). This establishes that -r*(xt) = (1 - b)b,.
Then, for x, satisfying x" < x, - xe, V(x,) = (1 - fl)-~h(x,, (1 - b)b,) from the definition of the value
function. [
Proof of Proposition 4: Let x, satisfy 0 < x, < x', where x' is sufficiently near 0. Since {(xt, ut): 0 < xt, x' and
0 _< Ut bt} is closed, there is a pair (£, a) that maximizes h(xt, u,) on this set. Now assume that 7r*(x,) < (1
- 6)b,; hence, xt+, - x'. Then
V(xt) = h(x,, r*(x,)) + 3,V(xt+) - h(x, i) + /3V(xt+,) h(x, a) + SV(.'),
where the second inequality follows from the fact that the value function is not decreasing. Hence, V(xt) < (1
- f )-'h(:, i). But lim, loh(x, a) < 0.
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